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Centre for Russian and East European Studies
University of Birmingham
In our paper we aim to show the changing economic significance of defence outlays in
the period of the second five-year plan (1933-7).1 This period emerges as a time of
transition. Rapid rearmament had been begun during the first five-year plan (1928-32),
but from a very low base. In terms of the rising volume of activity, the following period
was less hectic. However, it was a period of exceptionally rapid change in military
technology and the technological level of defence industry products. It was followed by
a third period (the third five-year plan of 1938-42, interrupted by war) in which the
pace of rearmament was again exceptionally rapid and from a much higher initial base
than before. Moreover the renewed acceleration of defence mobilisation began in
1936, when the second five-year plan was still under way.
Central to our conventional picture of the Soviet economy in the second five-
year plan are what Naum Jasny called the ‘three good years’ of 1934-6. These were
years of good harvests, rapidly rising production, de-rationing of consumer markets,
and rising wages and farm incomes. For the defence sector, in contrast, these emerge
as years of struggle and tribulation.What the budget figures show
(A) Reliability of defence data
Between 1931 and 1934, the published Soviet figures for defence expenditure were
considerably underestimated. In 1933, the first year of the second five-year plan, the
published figure for the expenditure of the People’s Commissariat for Military and
Naval Affairs (NKVM, renamed People’s Commissariat for Defence - NKO - in 1934) was
1421 million rubles but the true figure was 4299 millions.2
In the 1934 budget the deception continued. The published estimate was 1665
million rubles while the true estimate was 5800 millions.3 But in September 1934 the
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2Soviet Union joined the League of Nations; and in November of that year the
Permanent Commission on Disarmament at Geneva prepared to adopt a far-reaching
document on the publication of military budgets. In November and December Litvinov,
the People’s Commissar for International Affairs, sent memoranda to Voroshilov asking
for new instructions about the data to be submitted to the League; Voroshilov was
head of the People’s Commissariat for Defence (NKO), into which the People’s
Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (NKVM) had been reorganised in the
previous June. In Litvinov’s memorandum of December 21, having received no
instructions from Moscow, he pointed out that eight countries, including Britain and
France, had already submitted budget documents to the League. Litvinov emphasised
that the new procedures would involve ‘the publication and submission of far more
detailed and full information than we submitted in 1932-3 and require a fundamental
change of all our system of publishing data on military expenditure’.4
On January 4, 1935, a laconic Politburo decision ruled that in the published
report on the 1934 budget ‘expenditure on the NKO shall be shown in the sum of 5
billion rubles’ and that the estimate for NKO in the 1935 budget should be given as 6.5
billions. This decision was formally confirmed by the Council of People’s Commissars,
Sovnarkom, three days later.5 The Politburo evidently decided that no useful purpose
would be served by continuing the gross concealment of defence expenditure practised
in the previous three years. Soviet fears of Japanese aggression in the Far East, with
which the United States strongly sympathised, and the victory of Hitler and the National
Socialists in Germany, provided adequate justification for the substantial military
expenditure, and made it necessary to portray the Soviet Union as a formidable military
power.
But this was not yet the full truth. The Soviet authorities were anxious to cover
up the fact that they had falsified past published figures for defence expenditure. In a
memorandum to Litvinov on March 11, 1935, Voroshilov rejected the proposal from the
League that expenditure for the previous three years should be recorded.6 Moreover,
the data now published for 1934 and 1935 were not the whole truth. A memorandum
sent to Molotov from the secret department of Narkomfin, the People’s Commissariat
for Finance, in January 1935 revealed that the actual expenditure in 1934 amounted to
5355 million rubles not 5000 millions, and that the estimate for NKO for 1935 was 7492
not 6500 million rubles.7
Publication and reality finally coincided in the 1936 budget. On December 15,
1935, the Politburo resolved that ‘expenditure for NKO shall be shown in the budget in
full’.8 The same figure for 1936 appears both in the published budget and in the
archives - 14800 million rubles.9
A separate issue is the coverage of the defence budget administered by NKVM-
NKO. The NKO budget figure, even when truthfully published, did not cover all defence-
related expenditure. In all years, separate allocations in the budget covered
expenditures on special, convoy and NKVD armies, on strategic stockpiles, and defence-
related expenditures in civilian commissariats and in local soviets (for example, on
mobilisation planning, civil defence, and military R&D). And the substantial expenditure
on investment, working capital and subsidies in the armaments industries continued to
appear under the ‘national economy’ heading in the state budget. On March 25, 1935, a
Politburo resolution on ‘openness (glasnost’ - yes, the same word) in military
expenditure’ agreed that the military expenditures of the civilian People’s
3Commissariats and local agencies could be reported to the League. But it also insisted
that information on investment in the armaments industries should not be provided,
except in the case of subsidies to armaments factories in the narrow sense. This was on
the plausible grounds that in Western countries private investment in the private
armaments industry was not reported.10 Thus investment in armaments industries
(table 10 below) does not form part of the expenditure of the NKO.
So far only patchy information has been traced on defence expenditure under
other budget headings. In the 1933 budget, the NKVM appropriation amounted to 4.7
billion rubles, but to this figure may be added other outlays on defence-related items as
follows: internal and frontier troops - 560 million rubles, defence industry investment
and subsidies - 630 million rubles, and defence-related outlays by civilian agencies - 720
million rubles. Thus the broader defence-related total of 6.6 billion rubles was 40 per
cent in excess of the NKVM subtotal.11
Too much should not be made of this point. Except in the years 1931-5, Soviet
interwar defence budgets corresponded roughly with a modern western definition of
‘defence consumption’, and with the measures of defence outlays used in other
countries. Other outlays in the broader ‘defence-related’ category either contributed
more to other goals than to defence (for example, the maintenance of large internal
security forces the primary task of which was defence of the regime against its internal
enemies), or else added to society’s ability to sustain a larger military burden in the
future through accumulation of fixed assets and the stock of knowledge, rather than
contributing to defence in the present. Therefore both consistency and comparability
direct our attention first and foremost to the defence budget itself, and only
secondarily to wider concepts of defence-related expenditure.
(B) The long-run context
Table 1 shows the evolution of defence budget outlays from 1928/29 to 1940. In the
first five-year plan period, nominal outlays on defence rose from 880 million rubles in
1928/29 to 4,034 million rubles in 1932. At the same time total government spending
rose roughly in proportion, so that the defence share, which fell at first, had returned to
about 10 per cent by the end of the period. The low point marked in 1931 should not
neglected - the 7 per cent which our table shows for that year, although much higher
than the false figure given out in public, was still the lowest percentage of the whole
interwar period. Still, the relative decline of 1930-1 was only temporary, and says more
about the growth of government administration and public investment than any
abolute decline in the defence sector.
In the early years of the second five-year plan, the proportion of one tenth was
maintained. In 1936, however, there was a very sharp increase in the budget share of
defence, which rose in one year from 11 to 16 per cent; by 1940, almost one third of
the state budget was being allocated to defence, which was now consuming more
rubles than the entire state budget of 1934.
The nominal value of defence outlays at currently prevailing ruble prices is not,
on its own, particularly interesting (on the other hand, as students of Soviet defence
outlays in the 1960s and 1970s are all too well aware, it is certainly a useful start).
Knowing how many millions of rubles were expended on defence merely invites the
question ‘how much is a lot?’ The ruble figures give us little impression of underlying
change in the scale and cost of defence activity. Nominal values were affected by
4abrupt changes in the price of goods and services in general and of defence goods in
particular. There are various ways of standardising the ruble figures, each of which has
its own advantages and difficulties. One obvious method commonly adopted in official
documents, already shown in table 1, is to compute the defence share of the state
budget. But the defence share of the budget requires much interpretation, given the
profound changes affecting the role of state finance in the economy as a whole. The
share of the state budget in overall economic activity was changing from year to year,
and was expanding violently in the first five-year plan period. There are various
alternative approaches to the measurement of defence activity in its wider context,
each with its own advantages and difficulties.The real growth of defence outlays (1): an overview
(A) Physical indicators
An impressionistic overview of the growth of real resources commanded by the defence
budget is provided by tables 2 and 3. In the 1920s the Soviet Union maintained a
regular army and navy of 586,000 (table 2). This was a small army, being less than one
in a hundred of the potential labour force (the demographic cohort of working age).12
There may be some under-counting in so far as these figures do not include the internal
security troops of the OGPU-NKVD. Nor do they count the part-time personnel of the
territorial army, conscripts engaged in nonmilitary service, or those undergoing military
training prior to call-up. In 1926/27 these together would have added 842,000 to the
published figure.13 Of course the military value of these additional numbers was far less
than that of the 586,000 regular soldiers. As far as later years are concerned, it is
important also to bear in mind that the territorial army units were absorbed into the
regular army in 1939. In the case of series A it is not clear whether established or actual
strength is intended; the shortfall of series A in 1937 below the census figure of that
year shown in series B may reflect recruitment above establishment (it is unlikely to be
due to the date of the census, which took place at the beginning of the year).
As table 2 shows, the size of the regular armed forces began to grow rapidly
after 1931, and numbers more than doubled under the second five-year plan. By 1937
up to 1.7 million men and women were in the ranks (col. 2), almost one in 50 of the
labour force. Even so, the rate of growth was about to accelerate again; between 1937
and 1940, the number of regular forces personnel trebled, reaching 4.2 million and one
in 25 of the labour force. However, part of the exceptional growth of 1939 and 1940 is
explained by absorption of the territorial units into the regular army.
What matters from an economic standpoint is not just the number of soldiers,
but the value of the military services which they supplied. This question is usually
answered with reference to their opportunity cost, i.e. the wage incomes which armed
forces personnel would have attracted in a civilian occupation. In other words, the real
value of military services provided by a given number of soldiers tended to rise through
time.
At the same time as numbers of service personnel expanded, so too did the
supply of weapons and other military stores with which they were equipped. Figures for
annual NKO procurement of ground and air weapons from 1930 onwards are now
available in somewhat more detail than previously published series, in 18 separate lines
5of defence products (the raw figures are presented in the appendix, tables A-1 to A-4).
These figures are combined into an index of the number of weapons supplied to the
armed forces, valued at 1937 unit prices, which suggests an increase of more than 20-
fold between 1930 and 1940 (table 3, col. 1).
It is important to understand the peculiarities of this measure. First, it is an
index of defence procurement, not production. The two could differ significantly.
Defence procurement was usually less than production by the value of deliveries to
industrial stocks of work in progress and finished goods, to industrial testing and
experimentation facilities, to the armed forces of the NKVD, and to net exports (e.g.
supplies of weapons to Spain in the civil war there, less supplies of warships and other
weapons acquired from foreign firms). Because of these factors the relative levels of
production and procurement could vary from year to year. However, their long-run
trends were unlikely to diverge by much.
Second, as a measure of procurement our index is a short cut at best. It is based
on crude numbers more than real values. It combines numbers of fighters, bombers,
heavy and light tanks, large- and small-calibre guns, and so on, weighted roughly by
relative 1937 unit values. This short cut takes no account of the changing technical level
and performance of a fighter aircraft, medium tank, or large-calibre gun (in precisely
the same sense as numbers of soldiers tell us nothing about their skills and training).
Given that these things generally improved during the period, a number-of-weapons
index puts a lower bound on our estimate of real growth in munitions procurement. It
also omits warships, and so neglects the shipbuilding dimension of interwar
rearmament altogether.
Warship construction presents many problems. Available series (gathered from
published sources) are reported in table 4. They show a more than 40-fold increase in
crude tonnage of ships entering service in 1940 compared with 1930 (col. 8). But the
series are severely affected by qualitative change, especially the shift in favour of
capital warship construction under the third five-year plan, as the striking change in
average tonnage of surface ships entering service from 1938 onwards reveals (col. 2).
Tonnage entering service was generally highly volatile; for example, more than 40 per
cent of deliveries under the whole second five-year plan entered service in a single
year, 1936. This reflected in part the construction period required for finished warships,
which was both long and variable, resulting in year-to-year fluctuations in work in
progress which were large relative to annual value added. A measure of naval shipyard
production or value added in shipbuilding would presumably rise much more smoothly.
For these reasons we do not try to incorporate shipbuilding into our aggregate measure
of munitions procurement.
The number-of-weapons index shown in table 3 (col. 1) suggests that the real
procurement of munitions nearly doubled from the end of the first to the end of the
second five-year plan (1932-7). The pace of change was slow, however, compared with
the rates of expansion recorded before and after, when munitions output measured in
this way quadrupled in two years (1930-2), and nearly trebled in three (1937-40).
The usefulness of the number-of-weapons index can be pursued in two
confrontations. One is a with an index of defence procurements originally computed by
Moorsteen and Powell using a variety of indirect evidence to fill the gaps in Bergson’s
series; the other comparison is with available budget series for defence procurements
at currently prevailing prices. In table 3 our present estimate (col. 1) is contrasted with
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munitions procurement grew 14 times over the period from 1930-2 to 1937, and 40
times over the decade. It contains a lot of interpolation, so its precise year-to-year
movement is not particularly significant, but its level in the early 1930s is very clearly
understated because its authors did not know about the official concealment of
weapon procurements in those years. Our index shows more modest growth comparing
1937 with 1930, with a far higher proportion of this growth taking place in the early
1930s under the cloak of secrecy. On the other hand, it should be born in mind that our
own figures certainly understate the long-run growth of real procurements. Comparing
1940 with 1937 the two indexes are roughly in agreement.
The second confrontation is between volumes and values. In table 5 the
number-of-weapons index (col. 1) is compared with an index of defence procurements
(col. 2) at currently prevailing prices. When real outlays are divided by nominal outlays,
an implicit unit price deflator is the product (col 3). The comparison suggests that from
1930 through to 1933 the unit price of a typical weapon was probably falling; this is
consistent with the available evidence of official estimates, and also of heavy downward
administrative pressure on industry. After 1933 unit prices began to rise, a trend which
persisted until the outbreak of the second world war.14 Again, we know of particular
cases where the prices of existing weapons rose markedly in the mid-1930s, and we can
also presume that the price of the typical weapon was rising because the assortment of
weapons was shifting rapidly towards much more complicated, costly items. If we take
into account the improvement in product technology and complexity over this period,
however, the quality-adjusted price level may have been rising more slowly, stable, or
even falling.
However it is measured, the volume of defence products grew far more rapidly
than either GNP or civilian industry. Between 1930 and 1940, the supply of munitions
grew many times - 20-fold or more. Over a slightly longer period, 1928-40, civilian
industry value added grew by two and a half times, and GNP doubled.15 If we confine
our attention to the second five-year plan (i.e. comparing 1937 with 1932), the
development of these different branches was somewhat more in proportion. The
number of weapons supplied doubled, while civilian industry value added, and GNP as a
whole, both grew by roughly two thirds.
Official documents also reveal that the main increase in the number of the
defence industry’s plants and innovation facilities took place between 1927/28 and
1936. At the end of the 1920s a mere 45 establishments were counted in the secret
core of the defence industry complex.16 At the moment of handover from
Narkomtiazhprom to the new Narkomoboronprom in December 1936 their number had
grown to 183 - a fourfold increase. There was little further increase in their numbers
before the second world war; when Narkomoboronprom was broken up in 1939, 218
factories were transferred to the specialised defence industry commissariats.17
This picture, too, may be somewhat understated. First, the typical defence
establishment of 1936 was certainly much larger and better equipped than its
equivalent from the end of the 1920s. What pointed in this direction was not only the
normal processes of industrial growth, but also the changing composition of the
defence industry, and especially the rise of huge, vertically integrated aircraft
production complexes. Second, the growth of the defence industry after 1936 may be
understated by the number of factories because the increase of defence orders for
7weapons and military equipment was so rapid that it could not be met by existing
specialised defence producers and resulted in a great increase in subcontracting of
defence orders to civilian industry.18
All such figures neglect the great qualitative transformation of the defence
industry in the period. But they do tend to confirm the idea of a break in the pace of
defence mobilisation in 1935, when the numbers produced of many important types of
weapons fell, e.g. rifles, medium and large-calibre artillery, medium tanks, and all
aircraft other than fighters. The two issues - the qualitative transformation of the mid-
1930s, and the break in 1935 - are closely related. The assortment of weapons and the
techniques of production were both in a state of flux.
As far as the product assortment is concerned, fighter aircraft can serve as an
example. In 1933 the number of fighter aircraft ordered was 360, of which 321 (90 per
cent) were I-5s. By 1935 fighter production had risen to 839, but I-5s had been
completely phased out, and now 800 (95 per cent) of the 839 ordered were I-15s and I-
16s, none of which were being produced in 1933.19 The I-5 was a biplane with a
maximum airspeed of 286kph. The I-15, also a biplane, could attain a maximum of
360kph, while the top speed of the I-16, a monoplane, was faster still at 454kph.20 The
introduction of newer, more sophisticated models of aircraft and tanks with more
demanding production requirements goes a long way towards explaining the sudden
dip in the number of weapons being produced in 1935 - partly because of the sharp
increase in the value of each weapon, partly because of the disruptive influence of
widespread technological restructuring of the production process. To give a single, but
not in the least untypical example, in 1935 and 1936, when the old TB-3 bomber was
being replaced by the new SB and DB-3, planned procurement of bombers was fulfilled
by just 26 and 36 per cent in each year respectively.21
In other branches of defence industry the pace of product modernisation was
less hectic, but there was still rapid change in process technologies. In 1933 a broad
subsector of the defence industry comprising artillery, small arms, ammunition, tank
armament, and optical equipment began a changeover to ‘production according to
Type “B” specifications’ (chertezhi lit. “B”), with the aim of setting higher standards of
adherence to specifications, uniformity of measures and materials across the range of
producers of identical or related products, and interchangeability of parts. Two main
benefits were expected to flow from widespread adoption of Type “B” specifications.
One was a great reduction in unit costs. The other was much easier enforcement of
product quality standards. The changeover was supposed to be completed in 1935, but
in practice was accompanied by much disruption, footdragging from the side of
industry, and delay.22
(B) Deflating the value of outlays
Table 6 shows alternative estimates of real defence outlays provided by Abram
Bergson. He estimated that, if defence outlays are deflated to constant prices of 1937
(col. 1), then by 1937 the real volume of defence activity was 10 times the level of 1928,
and that between 1937 and 1940 there was a 2.7-fold further increase. This estimate
confirms striking real growth, although not on the scale of the nominal budget figures -
over the same subperiods, the ruble value of defence outlays at current prices rose 20
times and 3 times respectively. However, a Gerschenkron effect is present. Bergson also
calculated the series up to 1937 in 1928 prices (col. 3). In 1928, capital was scarce and
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substituted for labour-intensive goods and services as it became relatively cheaper
during the 1930s, series for real outlays based on early-year weights grow more rapidly
than the same weighted by late-year prices.
The principles of Bergson’s methodology were sound. He attempted to break
down nominal defence outlays into their separate components (maintenance of
personnel and facilities, the purchase of weapons and military equipment, defence
construction costs, and so on), and compiled separate price deflators for each
component in order to reevaluate them in prices or costs of a given year. From our
point of view one significant disadvantage of Bergson’s series is that it was computed
only for periodic benchmark years, with no figure for the early 1930s, and did not
capture the turning points which would be revealed by annual series.23 It made careful
and fruitful use of the data available at the time, but has not proved particularly robust
in the light of the archival evidence. This point is best illustrated by the example of
defence orders for weapons and military equipment.
Table 7 presents the series now available for budget defence outlays over the
second five-year plan, distributed among military equipment (weapons and other
military stores), construction (barracks and other troop facilities, fortifications, airfields
and so on), and maintenance (the the running costs of the armed forces: the pay and
subsistence of troops, their personal kit, the costs of military transport, operations, and
equipment repairs). This table confirms a near fourfold increase in ruble outlays on the
procurement of weaponry between 1932 and 1937, the final years of the first and
second five-year plan periods. The figures also show that military equipment was a
sizeable proportion of the defence total, usually around one third, but less in particular
years such as 1935, and tending to fall towards the end of the period as the demands of
modernisation began to yield to the growing urgency of numerical expansion of military
personnel.
The deflators which Bergson applied to his estimate of munitions outlays were
based on what he thought was happening to input costs and the prices of comparable
goods. He used a freehand average of prices for civilian machinery and related material
inputs (high-grade steel, rolled nonferrous metal products, and inorganic chemicals),
and wages of public sector industrial workers. On this basis, Bergson suggested,
munitions prices must have risen by roughly two thirds between 1928 and 1937, and by
another one fifth up to 1940.
The evidence of official documents suggests that price trends affecting
munitions were at best highly volatile, and at worst virtually impossible to pin down
into a quantitative overall measure. Superficial indications are that they fell from the
late 1920s through to 1932 or 1933, and thereafter rose. Thus, for their own purposes
defence officials often calculated the cost of the current year’s procurements at prices
of the previous year to illustrate how much of the change was attributable to price
inflation or deflation. The price changes taken into account probably only covered the
subset of products procured in both years, and therefore could either overstate or
(more likely) understate the underlying change. These calculations suggested a price
level which fell continuously from 1928/29 through to 1933.24
For the mid-1930s we depend on available documentation of the changing
prices of individual weapons, which is necessarily anecdotal in character. Thus between
1932 and 1935 there is fragmentary evidence of substantial inflation in the prices of
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of the upward trend in 1936 and 1937.26 However, more general indications are that
the inflation continued. In November 1936 the chief of the General Staff complained
that ‘there is no military item for which we have not had a price increase by 10, 20, 30
or more per cent’ during the year.27 A Gosplan document, however, put the increase in
armament prices at 8.6 per cent in 1936 compared with 1935.28
All these indications suffer from a common defect. To what extent may the
prices of goods which remained in serial production from one year to another be
thought of as proxies for the prices of all goods? They were only a part of the overall
product assortment, a highly variable part, sometimes only a small part. New products
ought to be incorporated into any measure of overall price change at prices
‘comparable’ with existing products, but what comparability means in practice may be
difficult if not impossible to determine. For overall price stability, the same
proportionality between price and user quality for new as for existing products is
required; products introduced at higher price/quality ratios may have contributed to
price inflation even if the prices of defence products already in serial production were
being held stable from year to year or forced down.
Above, we gave the example of the wholesale conversion of the aircraft industry
in 1933-5 from I-5 fighters to a new generation of I-15s and I-16s. As it happens, the
factory price of an I-16 in 1936 was 86,000 rubles, whereas the price of an I-5 in 1934
had been 56,400 rubles.29 Thus, in two years the price of a ‘typical’ fighter aircraft rose
by one half. However, what should matter to us is not the increase in the ruble price,
but the proportion between the prices of the two aircraft and their real production
requirements in plywood and metallic sheets and spars, instruments and controls,
machining, assembly, spares, and so forth. Whether this proportion rose or fell cannot
be judged on present information.Real growth of defence outlays (2): period by period
Below we take a more pragmatic approach to evaluation of real growth of defence
outlays over relatively short sub-periods, using a variety of direct and indirect evidence
of relevant trends. The main point is that, whatever our uncertainty over exact figures
and longer periods, it remains the case that the figures in current rubles during both
the first and second five-year plans, both for defence outlays under the NKVM-NKO
budget and for other kinds of defence-related expenditure, greatly exaggerate real
growth, as they do not allow for price increases in these years.
(A) 1933 compared with 1928/29
During the first five-year plan, price inflation was already very considerable. The NKVM
budget in current prices increased by over 450 per cent; what was the increase in real
terms? (Here we compare 1933, nominally the first year of the second five-year plan,
with 1928/29, as the data for 1933 are fuller; expenditure in current prices in 1932 and
1933 was almost the same).
The three main headings in the defence budget covered military equipment,
construction, and maintenance. In the cases of military equipment and construction
prices appear to have been stable or rising gently, but in the case of maintenance price
increases were very large.
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1. Military equipment. The prices of armaments’ orders were controlled, and cost
increases were subsidised, though hidden inflation no doubt occurred in fixing the
prices of new products. In 1933 the value of military orders in current prices was 77
per cent greater than in 1931, while gross output of military products by the
armaments industries at ‘unchanged’ 1926/27 prices increased by 85 per cent.30
This suggests a moderate price deflation.
2. Construction costs were fairly stable in 1928-31, but increased in civilian
construction by over 30 per cent in 1931-2, and the cost of military construction
may have increased similarly.
3. Maintainance. In 1928/29-1933 the size of the armed forces increased from about
550,000 to 885,000 men (table 2), or by about 60 per cent, and the real cost of
maintenance probably increased by a similar percentage. In current prices the cost
increased by more than 300 per cent, so the price level of goods and services for
maintenance in 1933 was perhaps 2.5 times the 1928/29 level.
Overall, prices for the defence budget probably increased by over 75 per cent in
1928/29-1933. But even after these adjustments are made, real defence expenditure in
1932 and 1933 was over three times the 1928/29 level.31
(B) 1937 compared with 1932
Between 1932 and 1937 the defence budget increased by 340 per cent (tables 1, 7). We
can evaluate the real growth of its components as follows:
1. Military equipment. The most difficult problem is to estimate the real value of
military orders. Four series are available:
a) NKO budget outlays on equipment (zakazy vooruzheniia i boevoi tekhniki)
(table 7). These are in current prices, and therefore exaggerate real
growth.
b) military production by the armaments industries in ‘unchanged’ 1926/27
prices (table 8). Here there are various difficulties, and three different
series are available. All the figures exclude arms production by civilian
industry. The degree of coverage of military industry varied over the
period. The coverage of series A was wider in 1937 than in 1932 because
of the intervening transfer of factories from the civilian to the military
sector. The subsequently compiled series B, which apparently attempts
comparable coverage between 1937 and 1932, shows a lower rate of
growth. Series C looks consistent with series B, but is deficient in
information about arms (as opposed to total) production of military
industry. In any case the data in 1926/27 prices, for well-known reasons,
may exaggerate the rate of growth because of hidden inflation - though
this is less likely with armaments, as with machinebuilding generally,
than with other products.
c) the number of workers in the armaments industries (table 9, col. 3). This
underestimates the growth of armaments production both because
labour productivity certainly rose during the second five-year plan and
because the workers in the defence industry were producing goods for
civilian consumption as well as defence, and the proportion of military
production in the total production of the armaments industries
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undoubtedly increased in this period. On the other hand, the coverage of
this figure increased during the second five-year plan as in (b) above.
d) our number-of-weapons index (table 3), based on 1937 prices of
products of which the output in physical terms is known, underestimates
the rate of growth, as it does not take account of the large technical
changes during the period.
In our estimate of the defence budget in real terms, we take as alternatives the
lowest index (number of weapons and number of workers) and the highest
index (nominal outlays on military equipment orders); the comparison is made
in table 9.
2. Construction. This has been deflated by the Moorsteen-Powell index of materials
input prices.32 The index has certain well-known weaknesses, but is the best
available.
3. Maintenance. As with the first five-year plan, we assume that maintenance in real
terms grew in proportion to the number in the armed services. We have taken this
as about 1,750,000 in 1937 (table 2). This implies that the prices of goods and
services for maintenance more than trebled in 1932-7.
Expenditure on the defence budget in real terms thus increased as follows




Using 1932 weights for the three items (military equipment - 38 per cent,
construction - 22 per cent, and maintenance - 40 per cent) puts the overall 1937
defence budget in real terms within an upper bound of 247 per cent and a lower bound
of 184 per cent of 1932.33
The main additional defence-related item was investment in the armaments
industries (table 10). In current prices, this increased from 778 million rubles in 1932 to
1,467 million rubles in 1936 (the 1937 fulfilment figure has not been available), or by 89
per cent. According to Moorsteen and Powell, investment prices increased by about 17
per cent between 1932 and 1937.34 So on this basis investment in the armaments
industries in this period increased by some 62 per cent.
The growth of both the defence budget and defence-related investment in the
armaments industries was considerably slower during the second than during the first
five-year plan, when both the defence budget and defence-industry investment more
than doubled.35 But the second five-year plan was a period of slower growth generally.
The share of defence in the state budget, and the share of the armaments industries in
total investment, both increased (tables 1, 11).
As in the first five-year plan, the second five-year plan falls into two quite
distinct periods: slower growth in the first two years, much more rapid growth in 1936-
7 (though growth is less rapid in 1937 than in 1936, following recovery from the 1935
crisis).
(C) Slower growth, 1933-5
The number-of-weapons index (table 3) shows a rapid increase in military orders in
1933, no growth in 1934, and a substantial decline in 1935. The extent of these annual
variations is implausible, and no doubt results from the insufficient representativeness
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of the index, and the pace of technical change in 1934 and 1935 as compared with
1933. However, there is no doubt that 1935 was a troubled year.1933
This was a year of economic crisis. From August 1932 large cuts were made in capital
investment plans; the cuts for the armaments industries were larger than for
investment as a whole, following the enormous increases in 1931 and the first half of
1932. The plans for military equipment orders were also systematically reduced during
1932. In July 1932, they had been planned at 3030 million rubles in 1933, nearly 50 per
cent above the planned amount for 1932.36 In August, the plan was reduced to 2620
million rubles.37 Then on December 3 the Politburo ruled that the defence budget for
1933 should not exceed 5000 million rubles, including military equipment orders to
industry not exceeding 1800 millions (less than the 1932 plan).38 The final plan was still
smaller (table 7).
In the outcome, investment in the economy as a whole in 1933, measured in
current prices, fell slightly; and investment in the armaments industries declined by 22
per cent (table 10). Defence construction by the NKVM (the ‘construction’ item of the
defence budget, see tables 7, 11) declined even more rapidly, after increasing
precipitately in 1931-2.
While armaments production and military equipment orders did not increase to
the extent shown by the number-of-weapons index (table 3), military production of the
armaments industries measured in 1926/27 prices increased by 15.6 per cent (table 8).
This increase is compatible with the slight decline in the nominal value of military
equipment orders in the defence budget; an archival document presents quite detailed
data claiming that the cost of comparable production in the armaments industries
declined by 13.3 per cent in 1933.39
All the increase in production measured in 1926/27 prices, and in military orders
measured in current prices, took place in the aircraft and tank industries.40 Military
orders and production in the shipbuilding, artillery and ammunition, and chemical
industries declined (table 12).The effect of the 1932-3 crisis on longer-term planning
During 1931, following the appointment of Tukhachevskii as the deputy to Voroshilov
responsible for armaments, the Soviet government approved a series of plans for the
production of major weapons covering a period of three or four years. These plans were
less ambitious than Tukhachevskii’s notorious memorandum of January 1930; but, like
the revisions of the first five-year plan in force in 1930 and 1931, they proved extremely
over-optimistic. The drafts of the second five-year plan prepared in the spring and
summer of 1933 were much less unrealistic. The debate centred on the feasible level of
capital investment in 1933-7.41 In the spring of 1933 alternative figures for investment
in the armaments industries were proposed by the Commission for Defence and by
Gosplan. Each of them assumed that this investment would be a higher proportion of
total investment than during the first five-year plan;42 but each of them also clearly
implied that the weapons plans for 1933 and 1934 could not be achieved until the end
of 1937 or later.43
In the summer and autumn of 1933, following the improvement in industrial
performance and the more stable situation in agriculture, the authorities quickly began
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to consider more ambitious defence plans. A commission headed by Ordzhonikidze
proposed that as much as 3650 million rubles should be invested in the armaments
industries, and in civilian industries producing armaments, in 1934 and 1935 alone.44
This implied in 1934 these investments would be at least treble the 1933 level.
This incident proved to be the last death-throe of ambitious planning. The
defence budget for the second five-year plan was finalised by the Gosplan defence
sector at the time of the XVII party congress in January 1934, when the main features of
the five-year plan were more or less finalised (table 13). While it envisaged a large
expansion as compared with the first five-year plan as a whole, its proposals for military
equipment orders and construction in the NKVM were not wildly optimistic if compared
with 1932, the last year of the first five-year plan. The average annual order in 1933-7
was planned at 2600 million rubles, as compared with 1532 millions in 1932; average
annual construction amounted to 900 million rubles, the same amount as in 1932. A
large expansion was envisaged in maintenance expenditure, from 1600 million rubles in
1932 to 2600 million in 1933-7 (average); this implied a substantial increase in the size
of the armed forces. The defence budget over the five years, 31,500 million rubles, was
780 per cent of the 1932 defence budget (4034 million); in the economy as a whole,
expenditure in 1933-7 (342 billions) was planned at 765 per cent of the 1932 level.45
The five-year plan as envisaged at the beginning of 1934 all assumed that defence
expenditure and armaments production would advance at a moderately more rapid
rate than the economy as a whole.1934
The defence budget for 1934 was predicated on similar lines. It was planned to amount
to 12.3 per cent of the total budget as compared with 12.0 per cent in 1933.46 Within
this total military equipment orders were to increase by 65 per cent as compared with
1933, and construction by 31 per cent (table 7).
The plan for investment in the armaments industries in 1934 envisaged an
increase by as much as 64 per cent as compared with the expected level in 1933.47 This
was far lower than the proposal of the Ordzhonikidze commission, but far more rapid
than the planned increase for industry as a whole.
In civilian industry, 1934 was the first of the ‘three good years’ of rapid
expansion of production following the large investments of previous years. The
armaments industries expanded at approximately the same rate as industry as a whole.
According to official figures in 1926/27 prices, all large-scale industrial production
increased by 20 per cent, while military production by the armaments industry
increased by 12 per cent (table 8). However, this figure excludes shipbuilding, in which
gross output increased by 53 per cent;48 if shipbuilding is included, the armaments
industries also increased by 20 per cent. Military equipment orders in current prices
increased by 29 per cent (table 7).
Investment in the armament industries increased by 26 per cent, considerably
less than planned. Taken together, construction by NKO and investment in the
armaments industries increased a little more rapidly than investment more generally,
by 29 per cent (tables 7, 10, and 11), as compared with 26 per cent for the economy as
a whole.49
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In 1935 gross industrial production as a whole, as measured in 1926/27 prices,
increased by 23 per cent and - an extremely rare occurrence - substantially exceeded
the plan in both the consumer goods and the capital goods industries.
In the 1935 plan the armaments industries had a higher priority than in the
previous two years. In the state budget at the beginning of the year military equipment
orders were planned at 2662 million rubles, an increase of 37 per cent above actual
expenditure in the previous year.50 A series of supplementary allocations for additional
armaments eventually increased planned military equipment orders to 3450 million
rubles, an immense figure.51
These allocations were intended to enable a revolutionary modernisation of the
armaments industries in two major respects. First, in the course of 1935 ‘the backward,
semi-artisan method of work’ would be replaced by ‘the contemporary method of mass
production’. After largely unsuccessful eforts to improve the production process in the
previous two years, at the beginning of 1935 Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze agreed to a
firm programme for the transfer of the 67 main armaments factories in the course of
1935 to new sets of drawings (Type “B” specifications). This would facilitate the
compatibility of parts between different weapons and factories and the wider use of
state standards; and it would reduce the dependence of the industries on highly skilled
and experienced workers.52
Secondly, the 1935 weapons programme envisaged major changes in the types
and grades of armaments. The head of the aircraft industry reported that thirteen new
types of aircraft were being introduced in 1934 and 1935, involving ‘huge technical
difficulties’;53 his critics acknowledged that the changes required were ‘very
complicated’.54
This vast programme soon got into trouble. By September 5 only 29 out of 139
items in the artillery and ammunitions industries had been transferred to Type “B”
specifications, and these not completely.55 The industry urgently demanded that the
transfer should be delayed; otherwise factories would have to temporarily cease
production.56 The military objected. On behalf of NKO, Gamarnik triumphantly sent
Molotov a copy of a telegram he had acquired in which the head of the armaments
industry illegitimately instructed a factory director to violate the planned transfer to
Type “B” specifications:
The main programme must be fulfilled...If you don’t prepare Type “B”, use
drawings of current production.57
The difficulties were compounded by the switch to new types of armaments. In
the aircraft industry, as late as October 1935 some factories were still struggling with
the orders for 1934. Then in November, Voroshilov complained to Molotov and Stalin
that only 859 of the 1334 aircraft planned for January-October had been delivered; and
this included only one single aircraft out of the three key new types scheduled to be
produced in 1935.58 In 1935 the expenditure of NKO on orders from the aviation
industry was actually lower than in 1934 (table 12). The Commission for Defence, on
Stalin’s proposal, replaced the head of the aircraft industry by M.M. Kaganovich, with
Tupolev as chief engineer.59
Armaments production as a whole was also unsatisfactory.The production of the
armaments industries as a whole, measured in 1926/27 prices, including civilian
production, greatly increased (table 8), but this was largely a result of the expansion of
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civilian production by these industries, not of armaments. Even shipbuilding, a success
story in 1934, increased production by only 12 per cent.60 Total military equipment
orders measured in current prices increased by only 14 per cent (table 7); and the
number-of-weapons index (table 3) shows a substantial decline in the number of
weapons purchased by NKO.
While the armaments modernisation programme largely failed in 1935, defence
investments reflect the intensification of the defence effort. The initial plan for the
national economy as a whole proposed an absolute decline in investment; within this
total the allocation to construction in NKO (628 million rubles) was also lower than
actual expenditure in 1934. But during 1935 the allocation was increased to 1174
million;61 and credits of 1186 million were eventually provided, of which 1086 were
eventually utilised (table 7). Similarly the initial plan for investment in the armaments
industries envisaged a sharp decline;62 eventually, however, they received 19 per cent
more than in 1934. Total investment in NKO and the armaments industries increased
from 6.5 per cent of all investment in 1934 to 8.1 per cent in 1935 (table 11).
(D) Rapid growth, 1936-71936
In the course of 1935 Nazi Germany adopted a increasingly aggressive stance,
introducing conscription in March; Italy invaded Abyssinia in October; a Berlin-Tokyo
axis loomed on the horizon. On March 31, 1935, Tukhachevskii published an article in
Pravda entitled ‘The war plans of contemporary Germany’. The article, corrected and
endorsed by Stalin, attacked German ‘plans of revanchism and conquest’ and reported
the state of German rearmament in alarming detail. A sentence written by Stalin
warned that the German army was now almost as numerous as the Red Army, even
though Germany had only 40 per cent of the Soviet population.63 On December 3, 1935,
Litvinov warned Stalin that Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and supreme
Economics Minister, had privately told a French banker that Germany intended to
divide up the Soviet Ukraine with Poland.64
Against this deteriorating background, the Politburo devoted increasing
attention to the enhancement of Soviet military strength. In May 1935 it resolved that
the armed forces under the NKO should be increased to 1,094,000 by July 1, 1936,
1,377,000 by January 1, 1937, and 1,513,000 by January 1, 1938.65 A later resolution
provided that 1½ age-groups should be called up in each of the four years 1936-9, so
that the conscription age fell from 21 to 19.66
The capital investment plans for 1936 approved by Sovnarkom at the end of July
1935 envisaged that investment in the economy as a whole would increase by only 7
per cent as compared with the expected outturn in 1935, but NKO construction would
double.67 During the latter part of 1935, NKO proposed exceptionally high increases in
its defence budget in the course of the negotiations about the 1936 plan. As table 14
indicates these proposals were sharply reduced, but the approved plan for military
equipment orders provided for an increase of as much as 143 per cent as compared
with actual expenditures on military procurement in 1935. The high figure for
construction approved in July 1935 was only slightly reduced.68 The approved plan for
investment in the armaments industries was also unprecedentedly large; it amounted
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to 1918 million rubles, more than double the 1935 level.69 These already large plans
were further increased in the course of 1936.70
Not surprisingly, these ambitious plans were not fulfilled. But in 1936, in
contrast to 1935, a large increase in armaments production was achieved. Military
equipment orders in current prices increased by 105 per cent (table 7); the orders
achieved amounted to 77 per cent of the revised planned figure, as compared with only
70 per cent in the previous year. The increase in production in real terms was certainly
less than 105 per cent. In 1936 subsidies for armaments, and privileged prices for
inputs, were partially removed. There was a sharp inflation in the price of existing
weapons, noted by both planners and the General Staff.71 Price increases may also have
occurred owing to the ‘overpricing’ of new types of production. But even our number-
of-weapons index, which does not allow for technical improvements, shows a rise in
production of 62 per cent (table 3).
In 1936 capital construction by NKO, measured in current prices, increased by as
much as 114 per cent, and investment in the armaments industries by 62 per cent
(tables 7 and 10). NKO and armaments investment taken together increased from 8.1 to
11.9 per cent of all investment (table 11). Thus 1936 was an important stage in the shift
towards rapid rearmament.1937
In the effort during 1935 and 1936 to reconcile the competing claims of industrial
development, rearmament and the consumer, state expenditure rapidly increased, and
inflationary pressures grew throughout the economy. In July 1936 the Politburo issued
directives about the 1937 plan which sought to stem inflation by returning to a more
moderate economic policy, in particular by curbing investment. The directives fixed
total investment in 1937 at 28.6 billion rubles, as compared with about 32 billion rubles
in the 1936 plan; as investment costs were planned to decline in 1937, the finance
provided for investment would be 20 per cent less than in 1936. The proposed cut also
affected defence: NKO construction was set at 2250 million rubles, with a financial
allocation of 1950 million, 18 per cent less than the final 1936 plan.72
The Gosplan proposal later in the year for investment in the armaments
industries involved an even greater cut, from 2718 million rubles in the final 1936 plan
to 1750 million in 1937. On December 7 Sovnarkom, in a decree on investment in 1937,
approved an allocation of 2150 million, an increase of 400 million over the original
plan.73 This was not the end of the story. In January 1937 the Politburo reconsidered
the matter and approved an allocation of 3015 million; this was to be achieved partly by
reducing other capital investment by 3 per cent, partly by transfer from the budget
reserve.74 Investment in the armaments industries would thus amount to 9.7 per cent
of all investment as compared with 6.9 per cent in the original draft plan.
Military equipment orders and NKO construction were the subjects of a similar
lengthy dispute. In August 1936 NKO proposed that defence orders should amount to
the huge sum of 13301 million rubles, 225 per cent of the revised 1936 plan;75 7594
million was eventually agreed, an increase of 28 per cent (table 7). In a memorandum to
Molotov on December 26 Voroshilov pointed out that this level of military equipment
orders would involve a reduction in the production plan for ships, rifles, guns, tanks and
aircraft.76 Construction by NKO was eventually fixed at the modest figure of 1875
million, substantially less than in 1936 (table 7). The proposed allocation to NKO
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construction was also the subject of a strong but unsuccessful complaint from
Voroshilov to Molotov, while within NKO Voroshilov’s deputies complained that even
Voroshilov’s rejected proposal (3025 million) would not be adequate to meet the
essential needs of the Air Force and the Far East.77
Available data on the results of the 1937 plan are incomplete. The plan for
investment in the armaments industries may have been fulfilled: in July-December 1937
the allocations amounted to over 1500 million.78 The NKO allocation to construction
was exceeded (table 7). While military equipment orders increased by 24 per cent, only
70 per cent of the revised plan for military orders was fulfilled, as compared with 77 per
cent in 1936. How far was this relatively poor performance due to the chaos resulting
from the large number of arrests in the army and in the armaments industries during
the 1937 purges? This remains to be established.Trends in the defence burden
If the size of the armed forces grew more rapidly than overall labour resources, and if
defence production grew more rapidly than total output, it follows that defence outlays
as a whole probably grew more rapidly than national resources. From this an increase in
the defence burden is infered. Here we touch on another approach to measuring the
economic impact of defence activities - a direct comparison of defence outlays with
national income. This can be done using either the Soviet net material product (NMP)
concept or a western gross national product (GNP) measure. It can also be done at
either current or constant prices.
When budget defence spending is compared with NMP, it tells us something
about the burden of defence upon the material production sphere. NMP measures the
total value of final goods, including intermediate services (e.g. freight transport) but not
final services (e.g. passenger transport). Part of the defence budget is expended on final
services such as the military services provided by armed forces personnel, but
servicemen are enabled to supply their services because they are supported by the
material production sphere. On the other hand budget spending can also be compared
with GNP, and shows how society allocates its total of resources available among
civilian and defence tasks, without making arbitrary judgements as to whether services
are more or less basic to economic life than goods.
The defence burden can be measured in current or constant prices, and a
different meaning is implied in each case. When both defence spending and national
income are valued at constant prices, their changing proportion shows the changing
relative scales of defence production and total output. However, a rising defence share
of GNP at constant prices need not necessarily mean rising civilian sacrifice. For
example, if over time defence goods became relatively cheaper, then a larger volume of
defence goods could be supplied without detracting from resources allocated to civilian
objectives; on the other hand, if they became relatively more expensive, then the same
volume of defence goods would involve a rising opportunity cost in terms of other
goals. This is revealed when the defence burden is calculated at currently prevailing
prices. In short, the defence burden at constant prices shows changing relative volumes
of production, but the same ratio at current prices suggests the welfare implications.
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(A) Defence and national income
It is much harder to compare defence spending with national resources than with the
resources in the hands of government, as was done in table 1. One reason is that our
national income measures for the mid-1930s are highly imperfect. National income at
prevailing prices may be readily compared with budget totals and subtotals, but the
figures available contain huge gaps. The official (or at least, officially accepted) series
for net material product at prevailing prices is broken for 1931 and 1933-6. Abram
Bergson calculated GNP at prevailing prices, but only for the benchmark years 1928 and
1937. The feasible comparisons are presented in table 15. Official figures based on an
NMP accountancy (col. 1) make possible the following observations: in the late 1920s
the defence burden on welfare was relatively low at 3 per cent or so, by comparison
with the prerevolutionary benchmark of 1913, but the latter had been exceeded by
1932, and in 1937-40 the burden climbed to a level unprecedented in peacetime. If it
had taken 7 years to double the defence share of the budget between 1930 and 1937, it
took only 3 years to double it again between 1937 and 1940, when almost 15 per cent
of national income was being consumed by defence. The recasting of national income
at prevailing prices to a GNP basis by Bergson (col. 2) does not significantly alter this
view; since the ruble value of GNP was a little larger than NMP, the level of the defence
burden appears slightly lower, and its dynamic is the same.
Comparisons may also be carried out in real terms (i.e. at constant prices or
costs), but again there are fundamental difficulties. Official figures of NMP expressed in
the ‘unchanged’ prices of 1926/27 are generally considered unreliable and are not
considered here. Western estimates of real Soviet GNP are preferable on this and other
grounds. However, for our purposes defence outlays must first be computed in the
same prices or costs as GNP. Bergson estimated GNP by end-use (including defence
outlays) at adjusted factor costs of both 1928 and 1937, but only for those years.
Moorsteen and Powell estimated GNP by sector of origin for every year after 1928, but
there was no annual series for overall real defence outlays (as distinct from the
procurement of weapons) to be compared with GNP.
Bergson’s figures for GNP and defence outlays at constant 1937 factor costs are
shown in table 15 (col. 3). In comparison with the defence share at prevailing prices
(col. 2), these suggest a lower defence burden (1.3 per cent) in 1928, and a greater
subsequent increase in the real volume of defence goods and services relative to total
real output. The comparison shows that the welfare impact of the increase in the
relative volume of defence activity was softened by the relative cheapening of defence
items.
(B) Defence and wage incomes
In order to find annual series which will throw at least some light on the dynamic of the
defence burden during the second five-year plan period, we make use of a compromise
measure of the defence burden on welfare: the total defence budget, divided by total
employment, expressed relative to public sector wage earnings. The advantage of these
figures is that they are available in annual series, and each series is relatively robust, but
their drawback is that they do not give a full picture, since overall economic welfare is
only imperfectly associated with wage incomes, and besides not all employees received
the public sector wage (collective farmers were the most numerous exception). The
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percentages which are computed do not mean that defence outlays were paid out of
wages, only that the ratio between them can be expressed numerically.
The results of this comparison are shown in table 16 (col. 3). They show clearly a
doubling of the defence burden - but from a low level - in the course of the first five-
year plan. In 1932-5 this burden remained roughly flat at 5 per cent or so. In 1936 a
sharp increase was marked, and the level of the burden now rose continuously, if
unsteadily, to the unprecedented ‘peacetime’ level of 18 per cent in 1940.Conclusion
(A) The results of the second five-year plan
Table 13 showed that defence expenditure in 1933-7 greatly exceeded the initial plan. It
is difficult to establish whether the plan was overfulfilled in real terms; price increases
which had not been anticipated took place during the last four years of the plan, and
affected the different items of the defence budget in different ways. Construction by
NKO amounted to a substantially higher proprtion of total investment than originally
planned, 5.1 per cent as compared with 3.4 per cent.79
In January 1937 the Politburo adopted a schedule of expected production
capacities on January 1, 1938. In some cases capacities equal those which had been
proposed for January 1, 1938, in the variants of the five-year plan discussed in the
spring of 1933; in other cases there is a substantial gap.80 As table 17 confirms, the
large investments during 1933-7 certainly resulted in greatly increased production
capacities, even in the crude terms of number of weapons. At the beginning of 1934
Voroshilov claimed that as a result of the developments during the first five-year plan
mechanical horse-power per soldier was higher than in the armies of the main capitalist
powers.81 World rearmament proceeded rapidly in 1934-7. On the basis of the above
figures the defence sector of Gosplan concluded in May 1937 that the Soviet Union
lagged in the availability of tractors and vehicles, but it now had a capacity to provide
more tanks per soldier than Germany and the United States, and greater fire-power per
soldier per minute than any other power.’82 Ironically, this memorandum was
completed at a time when the defence sector was being devastated by the arrest of
Tukhachevskii and other senior soldiers, and of many leading personnel in the
armaments industries.
(B) The second five-year plan in a long view
The evolution of Soviet interwar defence spending can be divided into three phases.
The first phase was one of economic demobilisation after the Civil War. After the
immediate post-Civil War cutbacks defence outlays tended to drift upwards, but with
economic recovery and the growth of the public sector the burden of defence on both
national income and fiscal revenues tended to go on falling. This phase lasted until
1930.
In the second phase, which began in 1931, there was rapid rearmament and the
real burden of defence outlays on national resources shifted to a higher level. The
burden on government resources did not grow, because the government’s share in
national resources was now far larger than before. At the same time the change in pace
of defence activity was greater than might appear on the surface from purely
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quantitative measures. There was an increased rate of military-technical innovation,
and obsolete weaponry was phased out, so that rearmament in the third phase would
be based on new weapons of a much higher technical level.
Thus the second phase was no more than a brief transition to the third phase
which began in 1936. In the third phase the growth of real defence spending
accelerated sharply. Its relative burden also grew markedly and became
unprecedentedly heavy by peacetime standards. Rapid rearmament gave way to
intense mobilisation.
The period of the second five year plan must therefore be seen in its context. It
began with rapid rearmament already under way. Before it was over, it also witnessed
the transition from rapid rearmament to intense mobilisation, which came in 1936. This
transition was one of considerable difficulty for the defence sector. The years 1934-6
were ‘three good years’ for production and living standards generally, but the armed
forces struggled to achieve their programmes, lurching from setback to crisis before
successfully forcing defence activity to a higher level in both quantity and quality.
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Table 1. Budget outlays, total and on defence,











1928/29 8784 880 10.0%
1929/30 13322 1046 7.9%
1930(4) 5038 434 8.6%
1931 25097 1790 7.1%
1932 37995 4034 10.6%
1933 42081 4299 10.2%
1934 55445 5393 9.7%
1935 73572 8174 11.1%
1936 92480 14858 16.1%
1937 106238 17481 16.5%
1938 124039 23200 18.7%
1939 153299 39200 25.6%
1940 174350 56752 32.6%
Sources
Plotnikov (1955), pp. 92, 132, 206, 215, 255, 261, 324, 423, 433, except 1931 from Davies (1993), p. 593,
and 1932-6 for which see archival figures in table 7 (col. 4). Differences between archival and published
figures are trivial for 1935 and 1936, and for 1937 the two coincide.
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Table 2. Personnel of the
Soviet regular armed forces
(thousands)

















Series A: Hunter, Szyrmer (1992), p. 138.
Series B, 1937: AN SSSR (1991), p. 164; 1939: RAN (1992), pp. 241, 244.
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Table 3. Alternative measures of the
real growth of munitions
procurement, 1928-1940 (1937 prices



























2 Moorsteen, Powell (1966), p. 629.
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Table 4. Ships entering service with the Soviet Navy, 1930-41 (units and tons)
Surface ships: Submarines: Combined
units tons units tons tonnage:
total per ship total per ship total per cent
of 1937
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1930 1 600 600 1 934 934 1534 22%
1931 1 600 600 5 4690 938 5290 75%
1932 5 3000 600 .. .. .. 3000 43%
1933 1 600 600 15 10845 723 11445 163%
1934 3 1452 484 34 7828 230 9280 132%
1935 3 1463 488 32 13777 431 15240 217%
1936 13 7360 566 46 25110 546 32470 462%
1937 6 2156 359 9 4869 541 7025 100%
1938 16 40474 2530 14 8800 629 49274 701%
1939 14 32048 2289 14 8845 632 40893 582%
1940 8 45058 5632 24 16390 683 61448 875%
1941
(Jan.-Jun.) 2 23230 11615 7 3980 569 27210 387%
Sources
Calculated from Korabli (1988), Dmitriev (1990) (figures supplied to the authors by Julian Cooper). Surface
ships were light cruisers, battleships, destroyers, patrol boats, minesweepers, and gunboats.
25
Table 5. Nominal NKO outlays on military
equipment compared with the number of



















1930 14% 6-9% 44-66%
1931 25% 15% 60%
1932 53% 27% 51%
1933 80% 27% 33%
1934 81% 34% 43%
1935 58% 39% 68%
1936 94% 81% 86%
1937 100% 100% 100%
1940 288% 345% 120%
Sources
1 Table A-7.
2 1930-1: as Davies (1993), p. 594; 1932-7: table 7; 1940: Harrison (1996), p. 284.
3 Col. 2 divided by col. 1.
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Table 6. Real defence outlays according to
Bergson, 1928-40 (billion rubles and per cent of
1937)









1 2 3 4
1928 1.7 10% .74 7%
1937 17.0 100% 10.60 100%
1940 45.2 266% .. ..
Source
Bergson (1961), pp. 128, 153.
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Table 7. State budget appropriations to the NKVM/NKO (the defence












1 2 3 4 5
1932
Actual 1532 900 1602 4034 38%
1933
Budget .. .. .. ..
amended 1753 678 2307 4738
Actual 1506 620 2173 4299 35%
1934
Budget 2494 812 2494 5800
amended 2292 745 2764 5801
Actual 1948 717 2729 5393 36%
1935
Budget 2662 628 4202 7492
amended 3194 1108 4983 9285
Actual 2226 1186 4762 8174 27%
1936
Budget 5420 2036 7349 14805
amended 5914 2428 8180 16522
Actual 4558 2518 7782 14858 31%
1937
Budget 7594 1875 10569 20038
amended 8108 1925 10588 20621
Actual 5658 1936 10472 18066 31%
Sources
1932 Military equipment is from RGVA, 4/14/1667, 20 (dated January 10, 1936). For construction
see Davies (1993), p. 593 - this is probably a planned figure, and therefore too high. The total
figure is from GARF, 8418/10/148, 5 (report from the secret department of Narkomfin to
Molotov, January 1935).
1933-5 For the amended budget and actual figures see RGAE, 4372/91/3217, 4 (report from the
defence sector of Gosplan, dated May 11, 1937).
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1934 The budget figure is from RGAE, 4372/91/1824, 56-5 (Gosplan report, dated January 31, 1934);
ruble sums for separate items are calculated by us from percentages given in the source.
1935 The budget figure is from RGVA, 4/14/1667, 16 (report dated December 26, 1935). Another
report in this file (dated January 3, 1936) (l. 17) gives the final budget as 9635 million rubles.
1936 RGVA, 51/2/444, 2-12 (report of the financial department of NKO, dated February 26, 1937);
we have estimated actual outlays as credits opened less those unutilised. These figures exclude
foreign currency outlays (11 million rubles in the original budget; 43 million as amended, and
24 million actually spent).
1937 For the original and amended budgets, see RGVA, 51/2/445, 1, 11, and for actual outlays ibid.,
13-14 (report of the financial department of NKO, dated June 13, 1938). These figures include
foreign currency outlays (17 million in the original and revised budgets, and 11 million actually
spent)
Note
Construction expenditure is given as credits opened for construction. Credits utilised were lower (from






Table 8. Gross production of armament industries, 1932-7
(million rubles at ‘unchanged’ 1926/27 prices)








1 2 3 4 5 6
1932 1500 2900 .. .. .. ..
1932 .. .. 1094 2084 .. 2795
1933 .. .. 1265 2083 .. 2387
1934 .. .. 1414 2742 .. 3015
1935 .. .. .. .. .. 4319
1936 .. .. .. .. 3846 6620
1937 plan 6550 9140 .. .. 6558 9054
Sources
Series A: RGAE, 4372/91/ 3217, 114-3 (report from the defence sector of Gosplan to the head of
Gosplan, dated May 20, 1937).
Series B: GARF, 8418/10/148, 13 (report to Molotov, dated January 11, 1935); 1934 is preliminary.
Series C: RGAE, 4372/91/3217, 118-6 (May 20, 1937).
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1 2 3 4
1933 98% 116% 91% 151%
1934 127% 129% 102% 151%
1935 145% .. .. 108%
1936 298% 256% .. 176%
1937 369% 437% 198% 187%
Sources
1 Calculated from table 7.
2 Table 8; 1937 is calculated as the planned figure compared with 1932 under series A, and those for
1933 and 1934 are compared with 1932 under series B.
3 Calculated from figures for defence industry employment in GARF, 8418/10/148, 13 (report to
Molotov, dated January 11, 1935) and for 1937 RGAE 4372/91/3217, 114-3 (report from the defence





4 Calculated from table 3, col. 1.
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Table 10. Capital investment
in armament industries, 1932-












1932 plan: GARF, 5446/57/16, 157 ('other', Sovnarkom decree dated December 13, 1931).
1932-6 fulfilment, 1937 plan: RGAE, 4372/91/3217, 115 (report of defence sector of Gosplan to head of
Gosplan, dated May 20, 1937).
1933 plan: GARF, 5446/1/71, 63 ('other', Sovnarkom decree dated January 5, 1933).
1934 plan: GARF, 8418/9/200, 1-2 (appendix, dated February 16, 1934, to Sovnarkom decree, dated
January 2, 1934)
1936 plan: GARF, 5446/57/40, 139-41 (Sovnarkom decree, dated February 8, 1936).
Note
1937 plan: on January 17, 1937, the Politburo approved 3,015 million rubles (see text of this paper).
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Table 11. The share of defence in investment, 1932-1937 (per
cent)









1 2 3 4
1932
plan .. .. .. ..
fulfilment 4.4% 3.8% 8.2% 7.5%
1933
plan 3.8% 3.1% 6.9% 5.5%
fulfilment 3.0% 3.4% 6.4% 6.0%
1934
plan 3.2% 3.5% 6.7% 6.8%
fulfilment 3.1% 3.4% 6.5% 6.5%
1935
plan 3.0% .. .. ..
fulfilment 4.4% 3.7% 8.1% 7.2%
1936
plan 6.3% 8.4% 14.7% 13.7%
fulfilment 7.3% 4.6% 11.9% 10.3%
1937
plan 5.6% 9.1% 14.8% 21.3%
fulfilment 6.4% .. .. ..
Sources
Defence construction: table 7 (credits actually utilised).
Defence industry investment: table 10.
Total and industrial investment, 1932: Davies (1996), 506; 1933-7: Zaleski (1980), 647-58.
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Table 12. Military equipment orders of NKVM-NKO, 1932-1937 (million











1 2 3 4 5
1932
Plan 312 428 791 74 322
Actual 246 229 580 58 316
1933
Plan 417 341 500 48 351
Actual 347 279 448 39 275
1934
Plan 510 345 568 49 565
Actual 440 354 470 30 544
1935
Plan 611 475 956 62 881
Actual 427 448 563 44 591
1936
Plan 1608 1085 1391 87 1332
Actual 1104 937 1102 49 1000
1937
Plan 2740 1037 2093 106 2194
















6 7 8 9 10
1932
Plan 4 .. 88 37 2057
Actual 3 .. 64 35 1532
1933
Plan 6 .. 67 55 1784
Actual 5 .. 62 43 1498
1934
Plan 15 .. 92 49 2184
Actual 7 .. 56 46 1948
1935
Plan 14 .. 77+26 55 3158
Actual 13 .. 73+12 56 2228
1936
Plan 46 119 116+32 96 5914
Actual 39 88 112+33 92 4588
1937
Plan 38 136 149+23 118 8274
Actual 30 67 134+30 92 5657
Sources
1932-5: RGVA, 4/14/1667, 20 (report of the financial department of NKO, dated January 10, 1936)
1936: RGVA: 51/2/444, 2ob-4 (report of the financial department of NKO, dated February 26, 1937)
1937: RGVA, 51/2/445, 66ob-68 (report of the financial department of NKO, dated June 13, 1938);
includes small sums received for ‘restoration of credits’. In addition to sums listed, 41 million
rubles was allocated to ‘packing for fuel’, and 27 million rubles spent. The plan was cut by 400
million rubles (from 8674 to 8274 million) on account of planned price reductions.
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Table 13. State budget appropriations to NKVM-
NKO (the defence budget) in the first and second
five-year plans (Oct. 1928-1932 and 1933-1937)









1 2 3 4
First five-year plan
Plan 1683 466 3386 5535
Actual 3919 1342 2683 7944
Second five-year plan
Plan 13000 4480 14020 31500
Revised 20745 6924 28775 56444
Actual 15896 6977 27918 50791
Sources
First five-year plan: all figures, RGAE, 4372/91/1824, 53 (report by Gosplan, dated January 31,
1934).
Second five-year plan: original plan, as first five-year plan. Revised figures: RGAE, 4372/91/3217, 10
(report by defence sector of Gosplan, dated May 11, 1937); note that this figure
approximately equals the sum of the annual budget plans. Actual figures:
calculated from annual data in table 7.
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1 RGVA, 4/14/1667, 1, 1ob, 2. The claim is said to be in 1935 prices, and therefore liable to be increased
owing to the planned increase in metal and coal prices and the intended abolition of privileged prices
for fuel.
2 RGVA, 4/14/1667, 16 (dated December 26, 1935); the figure for maintenance includes 866 million
rubles for the increased price of fodder and food and 436 million rubles for increased servicemen's
pay (consequent upon the increase of prices following the abolition of rationing).
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Table 15. The defence burden, from TsSU
















1913 4.5% .. ..
1928 3.0% 2.4% 1.3%
1929 3.1% .. ..
1930 3.2% .. ..
1931 .. .. ..
1932 4.5-4.8% .. ..
1933 .. .. ..
1934 .. .. ..
1935 .. .. ..
1936 .. .. ..
1937 7.2% 6.2% 7.9%
1938 9.0% .. ..
1939 11.9% .. ..
1940 14.7% 13.0% 17.3%
Sources
1 The defence share in 1913, from Davies (1993), p. 000. NMP in 1928-30 from Wheatcroft, Davies
(1985), p. 127; in 1932 from Davies (1996), p. 505; in 1937-45 from RGAE, 4372/95/168, 79-80.
Defence outlays in 1913 from Davies (1958), p. 65; other years from table 1, cols 2, 3, adjusted to
calendar year.
2, 3 Calculated from Bergson (1961), pp. 46, 128.
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person in employ- ment,
full time equi- valent
rubles thou. rubles per cent of
earnings
1 2 3 4
1929 800 51100 19.66 2.5%
1930 936 51500 23.65 2.5%
1931 1127 52800 33.90 3.0%
1932 1427 53400 75.54 5.3%
1933 1566 54200 79.32 5.1%
1934 1858 57700 93.47 5.0%
1935 2274 62800 130.35 5.7%
1936 2770 62300 238.89 8.6%
1937 3047 66000 264.86 8.7%
1938 3467 69100 335.75 9.7%
1939 3867 71600 .. ..
1940 3972 79100 717.47 18.1%
Sources
1 Zaleski (1971) pp. 344-5; Zaleski (1980), pp. 562-3, 592-3.
2 Total employment (full time equivalents) from Moorsteen, Powell (1966), p. 643.
3 Defence outlays from table 1, cols 2, 3, adjusted to calendar year, divided by col. 2.
4 Col. 3, divided by col. 1.
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1, 1938, on Jan.
17, 1937
1 2
Guns (thou.) 11.2 38.5
Shells (million) 45.5 100
Rifles (million) 1.4 ..
Machineguns (thou.) 114 250
Aircraft (thou.) 7.5 20.5
Aeroengines (thou.) 15.4 42.3
Tanks (thou.) 10.5 35.4
Gunpowder (thou. tons) 43 139
Sources
1 RGAE, 4372/91/1445, 181-80 (memorandum from the defence sector of Gosplan, dated April 4,
1933).
2 RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/20, 193-4 (Politburo decision, dated January 17, 1937).
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Appendix: the number of weapons, 1930-40
In this appendix we ask how the sheer number of weapons available for acquisition by
the Soviet armed forces changed over the 1930s. The ‘number of weapons’ means
numbers of fighters, bombers, heavy and light tanks, large- and small-calibre guns, and
so on, weighted by relative 1937 values. This takes no account of the changing technical
level and performance of a fighter aircraft, medium tank, large-calibre gun, and so on,
but is still be better than nothing. It relies on series chiefly (not exclusively) for NKO
procurement of18 separate lines of defence output, roughly priced from NKO files for
1937 as follows:
table A-1: NKO procurement of armament (4 series: small-, medium-, large-calibre
artillery, mortars), and small arms (2 series: rifles, machine guns)
table A-2: NKO procurement of ammunition (4 series: shells, mortar shells, bombs, rifle
cartridges)
table A-3: Gosplan figures for production of tanks (3 series: heavy, medium, light)
table A-4: NKO procurement of aircraft (5 series: fighters, bombers, reconnaissance,
trainers, passenger etc.), partly from NKO files, partly from published sources).
In tables A-5 and A-6 these series are compared with previously published
figures for defence output. They show clearly that the latter figures were really figures
for procurement, not production. Evidence of discrepancies between production and
procurements is confined to tanks and aircraft. In the case of tanks divergences are
small: it is apparent from table A-5 (cols 2, 3) that production and procurement
coincided closely in most years. Therefore, in computing an overall procurements index,
in the case of tanks I substitute production figures for the sake of their greater detail.
Larger discrepancies arise in the case of aircraft (table A-6). Procurements fell
substantially below the quite detailed production figures recently published by
Gennadii Kostyrchenko in all years (it appears on the surface that the latter had more in
common with procurement plans than with outcomes). Probably civilian procurement
was an important factor, but direct evidence is lacking.
In table A-7 the representativeness of the series used is considered, and a
summation is carried out. The first step is to calculate series for each group of weapons
separately using the constant 1937 prices shown in each table (A-1 to A-4). This yields
the figures shown in columns 2-5 of table A-7.
Next is to ascertain the representativeness of the figures used compared with
total NKO procurements in 1937. The last rows of table A-7 show that the product
series underlying the table accounted for roughly half the total of defence procurement
in 1937, including three quarters of aircraft purchases, but only one eighth of
ammunition. Lack of representativeness is to be explained partly by deficient coverage
of product series, partly by understatement of typical procurement costs in 1937. Some
account must be taken of these factors, because otherwise our measure would be
excessively dominated by aircraft, which represented only 45 per cent of the value of
military equipment orders in 1937 (1,803/4,014 million rubles), compared with two
thirds of the 1937 value of the product series used in our calculations (1,348/2,020
million rubles). To compensate for this, each series (cols 2-5) is divided by its
percentage of representativeness in 1937 before summing across the columns to arrive
at the total (col. 1).
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The series shown in table A-7 under col. 1 is therefore the final result. Perhaps it
is worth reminding the reader how the ruble values should be interpreted; they indicate
the crude number of weapons procured in any given year, valued as if they were typical
weapon units of 1937, not taking into account the changing technical and quality
characteristics of each weapon series.
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Table A-1. NKO procurement of armament and small arms, 1930-1940
(physical units)






1 2 3 4 5 6
Rubles
per unit 20000 70000 240000 5000 150 500
1930 344 600 8 .. 126 9.6
1931 1040 870 1 55 174 40.9
1932 972 1576 26 .. 224 45
1933 2884 1703 51 .. 241 32.6
1934 2521 1527 75 .. 303 29.2
1935 3395 974 14 .. 221 31.8
1936 3695 1513 27 .. 403 31.1
1937 3738 1656 49 1587 567 74.6
1938 7300 5262 125 377 1171 112
1939 8965 7224 270 4457 1497 96.4
1940 7063 6437 224 38349 1461 ..
Source
Procurement figures are from GARF, 8418/25/14, 2-3, cited by Simonov (1996), pp. 84, 91, 92, 112, 129.
Typical unit prices are estimated freehand from sources listed above and other evidence, direct and
indirect.
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(thou.) (thou.) (thou.) (thou.)
1 2 3 4
Rubles
per unit 10 5 10 0.04
1930 790 .. 14 235
1931 751 .. 316 234
1932 1224 .. 147 260
1933 2135 .. 317 311
1934 1504 .. 369 191
1935 1578 .. 154 612
1936 5200 .. .. 722
1937 4924 .. 795 1015
1938 12426 603 1728 1848
1939 18099 2741 2834 2194




Table A-3. Tank production from




per unit 500000 200000 100000
1930 .. .. 170
1931 .. 247 493
1932 .. 396 2643
1933 2 1046 2771
1934 10 1155 2394
1935 7 532 2455
1936 15 1150 2770
1937 10 816 732
1938 11 1198 1061
1939 6 1472 1508
1940 243 833 1620
Sources
Production figures are from RGAE, 4372/99/1001, 20-21, except 1930 for which we use NKO procurement
(as table A-1), and 1931 for which the figure of 247 medium tanks procured is calculated as a total NKO
procurement of 740 (as table A-1), minus 493 light tanks (as col. 3). Typical unit prices are estimated
freehand as table A-1.
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1 2 3 4 5
Rubles
per unit 150000 700000 150000 60000 500000
1930 326 52 328 160 32
1931 120 100 389 172 79
1932 74 72 659 700 229
1933 336 291 1083 951 291
1934 570 392 1172 674 301
1935 776 59 416 163 198
1936 938 341 553 470 386
1937 2129 1303 277 655 71
1938 2016 2017 197 1111 128
1939 4150 2744 586 2997 281
1940 4657 3674 122 1891 221
Sources
The source for table A-1 gives figures only for the total of units procured, and for fighters and bombers
separately (cols 1 and 2 above) for years after 1930. The division of the total for 1930, and of all aircraft
other than fighters and bombers for years after 1930 among relatively inexpensive reconnaissance and
trainer aircraft (cols 3 and 4) and much more costly passenger and transport aircraft (col. 5) is estimated
on the basis of the proportions suggested by Kostyrchenko (1992), pp. 432-3. Typical unit prices are
estimated freehand as table A-1.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1930 170 .. 170 952 952 126 126
1931 740 493 740 1966 1911 174 174
1932 3038 3039 3038 2574 2574 224 224
1933 3509 3819 3509 4638 4638 241 241
1934 3565 3559 3565 4123 4123 303 303
1935 3055 2994 3055 4383 4383 222 221
1936 4800 3935 4804 4324 5235 403 403
1937 1559 1558 1559 5473 5443 578 567
1938 2271 2270 2271 12340 12687 1175 1171
1939 2950 2986 2986 17348 16459 1503 1497
1940 2794 2696 2790 15300 13724 1461 1461
Sources
1, 4, 6 Harrison (1985), p. 250.
2 RGAE, 4372/99/1001, 20-21.
3, 5, 7 As table A-1.
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NKO procurement Production from
Kostyrchenko
realised planned series A series B
1 2 3 4 5
1930 899 899 1232 1149 1138
1931 860 860 2024 1489 1348
1932 1734 1734 3496 2509 2460
1933 2952 2952 3332 4115 4093
1934 3109 3109 3595 4455 4453
1935 2529 1612 2337 2529 2521
1936 3770 2688 4169 4270 4274
1937 4435 4435 4896 6039 6033
1938 5467 5469 7500 7727 7690
1939 10382 10758 9091 .. 10336
1940 10565 10565 13864 .. 9776
Sources
1 Harrison (1985), p. 250.
2, 3 As table A-1.
4 Kostyrchenko (1992), p. 431.
5 Kostyrchenko (1992), pp. 432-3.
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Table A-7. The number of weapons in military procurement,







1 2 3 4 5
Value (million rubles)
1930 551 75 17 17 160
1931 1002 129 20 99 196
1932 2145 192 24 344 317
1933 3230 242 37 487 619
1934 3241 235 26 475 727
1935 2327 188 42 355 329
1936 3779 262 81 515 684
1937 4014 333 98 241 1348
1938 6881 778 218 351 1874
1939 9873 1045 311 448 2952
1940 11552 1057 430 450 3512
Representativeness in 1937
Value of units procured (million rubles)
2020 333 98 241 1348
Equipment outlays in budget (million rubles)
4014 661 735 814 1803
Representativeness of units (per cent)
50% 50% 13% 30% 75%
Source
Values of units procured are estimated from tables A-1 to A-4.
Representativeness is calculated as estimated values of units procured in 1937 divided by nominal outlays
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Moscow)
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Endnotes
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented to the Soviet Industrialisation Project
seminar at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham.
We are grateful to the participants for valuable discussion, and especially to Julian
Cooper and Lennart Samuelson for comments and other assistance acknowledged
below. We wish to thank staff and researchers at the various Russian archives listed at
the end of the paper. Finally, we thank the ESRC for financial support of our projects on
“The Soviet defence industry complex from Lenin to Khrushchev” (grant no.
R000221176) and “Economic development and centre-local relations in the Soviet
command economy” (grant no. R000235636).
2 See Cooper (1976), p. 35 and table 1 below. The figure given for 1933 as the actual
expenditure in Davies (1993), p. 593, was evidently the planned estimate, though this
was not stated in the archival source.
3 See Cooper (1976), p. 35, and table 1 below.
4 For these memoranda see Vestnik MID, no. 3 (61), 1990, pp. 70-1.
5 RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 119; GARF, 5446/57/35, art. 23/6ss. The Politburo decision was
taken by correspondence. A further Politburo decision by correspondence on February 19
resolved that NKO should prepare data on military expenditure for the League of Nations
Yearbook and submit it to the Politburo for approval (RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 104). These
documents were not available for the account in Davies (1993), pp. 581-2.
6 Vestnik MID, no. 3 (61), 1990, p. 76, and the further memorandum from the NKO of
April 4 (ibid. p. 79 - clause 6).
7 GARF, 8418/10/148, 5.
8 RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/19, 16 (decision by correspondence); the same decision was adopted
as a Sovnarkom decree on the following day (GARF 5446/57/38, 183 - art. 2673/441s).
9 See Cooper (1976), p. 35 and table 1 below.
10 RTsKhIDNI, 17/162/17, 159-60 (decision by correspondence).
11 GARF, 8418/8/137, 11-12 (appendix to Sovnarkom decree dated January 5, 1933).
Figures cited by Davies (1993), p. 593, similarly showed that in January-March 1933 the
total allocation to defence purposes was 39.8 per cent greater than the allocation to
NKVM. The 1935 budget showed an even higher proportion of non-NKO defence
expenditure: GARF, 8418/10/129, 1-2 (decree of Commission of Defence dated April 2,
1935, which does not, however reveal a figure for internal and security troops).
12 For numbers in the labour force (1926/27 - 83.7m, 1932 - 88.6m, 1937 - 89.6m, 1940
- 100.8m), see Eason (1963), p. 77.
13 RGVA, 33988/3/81, 39 (Red Army staff memorandum, August 5, 1927); the authors
are grateful to Lennart Samuelson for this reference.
14 The result is notably in agreement with the index of munitions procurement prices
computed independently by Bergson (1961), 72, which showed 1928 as 60 per cent of
1937, and 1940 as 120 per cent.
15 Moorsteen, Powell (1966), pp. 622-3.
16 RGAE, 2097/1/1051, 17-18 (November 15, 1929).
17 For further detail see Simonov (1996), pp. 38-41.
18 Tupper (1982).
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19 Kostyrchenko (1992), pp. 432-3. Kostyrchenko’s figures for total output differ
somewhat from the procurement figures used in table A-4 (for further discussion see
the appendix).
20 Iakovlev (1979), pp. 24, 32.
21 Simonov (1996), pp. 91-2.
22 These difficulties are attested by a variety of reports and memoranda in RGVA,
4/14/1298, 140-44 (Efimov to Voroshilov, September 9, 1935), 145 (Voroshilov to
Piatakov, December 2, 1935), 147 (Kaganovich to Molotov), 150 (Gamarnik to Molotov,
October 1935), 151-2 (Efimov to Tukhachevskii and Pavlunovskii, January 31, 1935);
RGVA, 4/14/1315, 198-201 (Pavlunovskii to Voroshilov, November 4, 1935).
23 Holland Hunter and Janusz M. Szyrmer have recently produced a new estimate of real
defence outlays estimate in annual series between 1928 and 1940 (Hunter, Szyrmer
(1992), pp. 41). This estimate therefore fills in the gaps between benchmark years left
by Bergson, but contains several disadvantages. Calculated in ‘balanced’ 1928 prices, it
generally confirms a picture of rapid growth (the prices are described as ‘balanced’
because they are derived from an input/output table after balancing). It shows
somewhat less real growth than either of Bergson’s (an 8-fold increase over 1928-37,
and a 2.3-fold further increase to 1940). This reverse Gerschenkron effect is surprising
and implausible. Unlike Bergson, Hunter and Szyrmer did not disaggregate defence
outlays and deflate the components independently. Instead, they simply deflated total
nominal defence outlays by an index of wages of engineering workers, with the
intention ‘to capture at least most of the inflation in the cost of military equipment’
(Hunter, Szyrmer (1992), p. 299). The wage index used ended in 1934 and Hunter and
Szyrmer extended it to 1940 by guesswork. Regardless of the reliability of the wage
index, this meant assuming in addition that wage earnings in engineering and the
defence industry moved together, that unit total costs in the defence industry moved in
proportion to wage earnings, and that the costs of maintenance and operation of the
armed forces moved in line with weapon costs. It appears likely that Hunter and
Szyrmer underestimated the true change in the volume of defence activity by
understating productivity growth and cost reductions in the defence industry, if for no
other reason. For the early 1930s the Hunter/Szyrmer series also suffers from the
official concealment of rearmament: there is therefore a false break in the series in
1934, when official distortion ended. It appears, however, to confirm a true break in
1936, with a 60 per cent estimated increase in real defence spending in a single year.
24 RGAE, 4372/91/2196, 1-2 (report from the head of the special sector of TsUNKhU to
the head of the defence sector of Gosplan, January 4, 1934).
25 This arises from a comparison of prices given in RGVA, 4/14/880, 13-14 (Khrulev to
Voroshilov, January 17, 1933), with prices listed by sources given in footnote 25.
26 RGVA, 4/14/1626, 9 (Red Army General Staff memorandum dated August 25, 1936);
RGAE, 7733/36/40, 109 (appendix to Sovnarkom decree dated December 17, 1936);
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a Credits actually used.
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higher 38 x 369 = 140
lower 38 x 198 = 75
Construction 22 x 141 = 31
Maintenance 40 x 191 = 76
Total
higher 100 247 247
lower 100 182 182
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